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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-3747
____________
MICHAEL NORWOOD,
Appellant,
v.
JOHN JOHNSON; RONNIE HOLT
__________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-01816)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
__________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 1, 2011
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 11, 2012)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Michael Norwood, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary-Canaan,
is a member of the Nation of Islam. He was participating in the kosher/common-fare

religious diet program at the prison when it underwent a change. 1 In June, 2009, the
Bureau of Prisons switched to prepared meals where certain items were no longer
individually wrapped. These pre-packaged meals were not always vegetarian. Prior to
June, 2009, some of the items in the prepared kosher meals were individually wrapped in
cellophane to ensure that kosher standards were met. After the change, Norwood
requested that Chaplain John Johnson provide him with a halal vegetarian diet consistent
with his religious beliefs. Chaplain Johnson apparently concluded that the diets provided
at USP-Canaan, that is, the “kosher/common-fare” and “mainline/no-flesh” diets, were
adequate to meet Norwood’s religious needs.
Norwood then submitted an informal request to his counselor, claiming that the
change meant that the prison’s kosher religious diet no longer satisfied Nation of Islam
teachings. On June 24, 2009, Norwood received a response from a counselor explaining
the prison’s two existing options, and advising Norwood that, if he was dissatisfied with
the options, he could submit a “New Or Unfamiliar Religious Components
Questionnaire” form to the chaplain.
Norwood then submitted a Request for an Administrative Remedy directly to
Warden Holt. On or about July 11, 2009, Warden Holt responded and noted that
Norwood had been advised to submit a “New Or Unfamiliar Religious Components
Questionnaire.” Citing Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5360.09, Warden Holt
stated: “While you have started completing this form it has been revealed that the
chaplain needs additional information from you in order to have it processed…. This is
1

Kosher meals meet the religious requirements for Muslims.
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provided for informational purposes only.” See Defendants’ Exhibit 3 in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment, at 6. Thereafter,
Norwood appealed unsuccessfully to the Regional Director and the Central Office. The
Regional Director also noted the incomplete “New Or Unfamiliar Religious Components
Questionnaire.” In July, 2009, Norwood was observed eating from the mainline-noncertified food menu, and, as a result, he was removed from the religious diet program. 2
On August 30, 2010, Norwood filed a complaint against Chaplain Johnson and
Warden Holt in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
alleging that they violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (“RFRA”). Norwood sought an award of
damages in the amount of $100,000.00 against each defendant and such other relief as the
court deemed proper. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment, arguing that Norwood failed to state a claim under either the First
Amendment or RFRA, that the defendants were qualifiedly immune from a suit for
money damages, and that Warden Holt lacked any personal involvement in the conduct
alleged. In a Declaration in support of the motion, Chaplain Johnson stated that Norwood
completed a “New Or Unfamiliar Religious Components Questionnaire,” but it had been
inadvertently submitted (by Johnson) to the Regional Chaplain, when it should have gone
instead to Warden Holt. Chaplain Johnson stated that a new form would be provided to
Norwood.
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Norwood would later argue that he ate from the mainline/non-certified food menu out of
necessity when his initial informal request for an administrative remedy was
unsuccessful.
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Norwood filed a response in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, etc.
In a brief in reply to Norwood’s response, the defendants grasped that Norwood wanted a
vegetarian halal diet free of cross-contamination by animal-based foods. This he could
no longer accomplish through the new kosher religious diet because it did not provide for
certain items to be individually wrapped in cellophane. The defendants argued for the
first time that Norwood had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to
this specific religious diet claim. They also stated that Norwood had recently completed
a “New Or Unfamiliar Religious Components Questionnaire,” seeking a vegetarian halal
diet free of cross-contamination by animal based foods. The questionnaire had been
routed to the Warden and the Regional Religious Services Staff, and a decision on
Norwood’s request had not yet been made. The defendants also advised the court that
one other federal prisoner had filed suit in the Middle District over an identical issue, see
Jupiter v. Johnson, D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-01968.
The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation, in which he
recommended that the defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment be
denied. The Magistrate Judge specifically considered and rejected the defendants’
exhaustion of administrative remedies argument, because Norwood had an appeal that
went all the way up to the Central Office. The defendants then filed Objections. In an
order entered on September 28, 2011, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss or for summary judgment, and rejected the Report and Recommendation
insofar as the Magistrate Judge concluded that the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity. The court concluded that the defendants were indeed qualifiedly
4

immunized from a suit for damages, reasoning that the Magistrate Judge had defined the
asserted “clearly established constitutional right,” see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987), as the right to a diet consistent with one’s religious beliefs. The right
defined by the Magistrate Judge was at too high a level of generality, see Ashcroft v. alKidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (U.S. 2011). In the District Court’s view, Chaplain Johnson
had merely failed to submit the “New Or Unfamiliar Religious Components
Questionnaire” to the correct party, but this minor error did not expose him to a suit for
money damages. Similarly, Warden Holt merely told Norwood that the Chaplain needed
additional information. His conduct too thus was cloaked in qualified immunity.
Norwood appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our Clerk
granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was
subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or summary affirmance
under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. He was invited to submit argument in
writing, and, in response, he submitted a pro se brief, which we have considered.
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. The
District Court properly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment because Norwood failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
bringing suit, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731
(2001). 3 Giving an agency the opportunity to correct its errors is a central purpose of the
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We “are free” to affirm the judgment “on any basis which finds support in the record.”
See Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
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exhaustion requirement. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). The Supreme
Court has explained that:
Because exhaustion requirements are designed to deal with parties who do
not want to exhaust, administrative law creates an incentive for these
parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to do, namely, to give
the agency a fair and full opportunity to adjudicate their claims.
Administrative law does this by requiring proper exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which means using all steps that the agency holds
out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the
merits).
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks removed).
Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 548.12, “[i]nstitution chaplains are responsible for
managing religious activities within the institution.” A religious diet is considered to be a
“religious activity.” See id. at § 548.11. The parties do not dispute that the “New Or
Unfamiliar Religious Components Questionnaire” is the form to be filled out when an
inmate requests a religious activity, like a new diet, and when additional information is
required by the Chaplain to decide whether or not to approve it. See id. at § 548.12.
Eventually, it should go to the Warden. In Norwood’s case, the agency inadvertently
failed to properly handle his form, resulting in the need for him to resubmit it. As the
District Court noted in prematurely reaching the qualified immunity issue, Warden Holt
neither granted nor denied Norwood’s request for a vegetarian halal diet free of crosscontamination by animal-based foods. Even the Regional Director noted the incomplete
“New Or Unfamiliar Religious Components Questionnaire.” Once the defendants
asserted in their reply brief that Norwood had recently completed the “New Or
Unfamiliar Religious Components Questionnaire,” specifically seeking a vegetarian halal
6

diet free of cross-contamination by animal based foods, and that the questionnaire had
been routed to the Warden for a decision, it was clear that the agency had not rendered a
final decision in Norwood’s case and that his federal civil action was subject to dismissal
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Proper exhaustion means using all of the steps the agency holds out, Woodford,
548 U.S. at 89, including, here, the unremarkable step of resubmitting a form the agency
lost, or resubmitting a form to clarify for the agency the exact nature of one’s claim.
Efficiency is not promoted, see Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 76 (3d Cir. 2000), by
allowing a claim to proceed in federal court under the circumstances presented here. The
importance of the lack of administrative finality in Norwood’s case cannot be overstated.
As the parties well know, the Jupiter case, D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-01968, raised the
identical issue. To illustrate that completion of the “New Or Unfamiliar Religious
Components Questionnaire” is an essential component of the exhaustion process in a case
like Norwood’s, and that agencies are capable of correcting their errors, we note the
following satisfying outcome. In a brief, defendants Chaplain Johnson and Warden Holt
noted that inmate Jupiter filed the required form on May 7, 2011; a kosher vegetarian
certified food menu then was approved for him, starting on June 5, 2011. See
Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of their Objections, Jupiter v. Johnson, D.C. Civ. No.
10-cv-01968, Docket Entry No. 53, at 5. The District Court dismissed the action for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and no appeal has been taken.
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For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District
Court granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment.
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